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Smart City: A Case of Seoul
ABSTRACT
mart City is a city that effi ciently and effectively solves its challenges in advancing the quality of life 
and work of its citizens by adequately making use of the best available technologies, which are mainly
infrastructure technology in the early stages of urbanization and information technology for everyday use. 
In addition, it is also argued that a city requires not only technology but also new regulations to become a 
smart city. With new technology and rules Smart City successfully achieves prosperity and sustainability. 
This paper briefl y reviews what defi nes a smart city and discusses the case of Seoul.
This paper discusses two exemplary cases showing how to build a smart city by using new technology 
and rules to reform public transportation and by adopting OPEN (Online Procedures ENhancement for civil 
applications). The fi rst example shows how Seoul diverted her mobility from a car-dependent city, which 
causes congestion, pollution, ineffi ciency and social cost, to transit-oriented city which improves sustainability, 
effi ciency, productivity, and quality of life . These examples confi rm that new technology and rules can 
increase the effi ciency of public services and create a bi-lateral governance system. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
TECHNOLOGY FOR PROSPERITY 
AND SUSTAINABILITY AND AN 
IMPROVED QUALITY OF LIFE
As more than half of the world’s population lives in 
urban areas, building or transforming a city to be 
smarter than before has become prevalent world-
wide in order to respond to the emerging challenges 
caused by rapid urban population growth and 
climate change. However, literature is limited on 
what constitutes a smart city or how to build one. 
To close that gap and in response to the increasing 
popularity of the concept, this paper will briefly 
review the working concepts of a smart city from 
various sources and will use Seoul as a case study. 
A smart city does not refer to a specifi c and fi xed 
end. Instead, it is one that effi ciently and effectively 
solves its challenges in advancing the quality of life 
and work of its citizens by making use of the best 
available technologies; infrastructure technology 
at the early stage of urbanization, and information 
technology. In addition, the paper also argues that a 
city requires not only technology but also new rules 
to become a smart city.
Although a smart city has been the talk of urban 
planning as of late, it has not been clearly defi ned. 
For example, Amsterdam Smart City, Smart City 
Wien, Smart City Expo, Smart Cities Summit, and 
Smart City Council have recently surfaced. Further, 
IBM, Cisco, Siemens and other global corporations 
have also adapted the term of smart cities. India and 
China have announced that they will build hundreds 









South American, European1 and North American 
countries alike. Yet, the word ‘smart’ is used with 
various connotations, which can be associated with 
‘intelligent,’ ‘ingenious,’ ‘fashionable’ and ‘stylish’. 
The term smart city also often overlaps with ‘smart 
growth’, ‘intelligent city’, ‘creative city’, ‘innovative 
city’, ‘eco city’, ‘sustainable city’, ‘ubiquitous city’, 
‘digital city’, ‘wireless city’,’ future city’, and smart 
grid. Since such vague definitions could mean 
too many things, this broad defi nition could lose 
particular signifi cance. 
The defi nition of a smart city varies as it is sometimes 
defined as an end-result or a goal, and other 
times defi ned as a process. For example, a smart 
city could refer to a city that makes good use of 
information and communication technology and has 
a high sustainability. Other times it could refer to a 
city that resolves the tasks it faces most effi ciently 
and effectively. The followings are some working 
defi nitions.
 “The vision of ‘Smart Cities’ is the urban 
center of the future, made safe, secure, 
environmentally green, and effi cient because 
all structures, whether for power, water, 
transportation,   are designed, constructed, 
and maintained by making use of advanced, 
integrated materials, sensors, electronics, 
and networks which are interfaced with 
computerized systems comprised of 
databases, tracking, and decision-making 
algorithms.” (Hall 2000)
 A smart city is a city performing well in a 
forward-looking way in six characteristics; 
smart economy, smart people, smart 
governance, smart mobility, environment, 
and living. these are built on the ‘smart’ 
combination of endowments and activities of 
self-decisive, independent and aware citizens 
(Giffi nger, et al. 2007),
 Smart city is “combining ICT and Web 2.0 
technology with other organizational, design 
and planning efforts to dematerialize and 
speed up bureaucratic processes and help 
to identify new, innovative solutions to city 
management complexity, in order to improve 
sustainability and livability.” (Toppeta 2010; 
recited from ITU 2014)
1 In Europe, the term ‘intelligent city’ is interchangeable with ‘smart city’.
 “The use of Smart Computing technologies to 
make the critical infrastructure components 
and services of a city, which includes city 
administration, education ,healthcare, public 
safety, real estate, transportation, and 
utilities–more intelligent, interconnected, and 
effi cient.” (Washburn2010)
 “IBM defi nes a smarter city as one that makes 
optimal use of all the interconnected information 
available today to better understand and 
control its operations and optimize the use of 
limited resources.” (IBM 2011)
 “In Smart Cities, digital technologies translate 
into better public services for citizens, better 
use of resources and less impact on the 
environment.…The smart city concept goes 
beyond the use of ICT for better resource 
use and less emissions. It means smarter 
urban transport networks, upgraded water 
supply and waste disposal facilities, and more 
effi cient ways to light and heat buildings. And 
it also encompasses a more interactive and 
responsive city administration, safer public 
spaces and meeting the needs of an ageing 
population.” (European Commission, https://
ec.europa.eu/; italic added by author)
The above working defi nitions show changes in 
the concept over time. It began with a possibility of 
newly emerging information technology which can 
be utilized for effi cient urban management. Later, 
corporations such as IBM, Cisco, and Siemens 
emphasize the technological component as the 
key component to their concepts of smart city. 
Scholars have criticized this senseless and placeless 
approach neglecting how cities really function and 
how citizens live and work in their cities. Recently 
the concept of a smart city returns to the original 
focus of the betterment of city and quality of life and 
livelyhood of citizens. 
In this sense, information technology may be 
necessary, but it is not suffi cient for a city to be smart. 
In other words, introduction of high technology in urban 
planning and administration itself is not suffi cient to 
become a smart city. Instead, improvements in quality 
of life and work should be presented to be a smart city 
although utilizing advanced technology is inevitable 
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As seen with the above definitions, the most 
fundamental concept of the smart city is a city that 
actively makes use of information and communication 
technology to provide solutions for the problems it 
faces. Information communication technology helps 
to make the city’s infrastructure more efficient, 
effective and provides better public service.
When it comes to a city’s governance, citizens make 
use of the traditional representative democracy to 
elect leaders, and under such a system it takes 
some time for the citizen’s demands to be refl ected 
by the government. But with today’s information and 
communication technology, the voices of citizens 
are more easily heard, and the time it takes for their 
opinions to be refl ected is signifi cantly reduced. As 
more citizens take part in deciding how the city is run, 
using information and communication technology, 
today’s cities are changing from a government 
system to a governance system. This two-way 
governance boosts the city’s effi ciency, improves 
the lives and jobs of its citizens and makes the city 
more sustainable.
Smart City: Developed vs. 
Developing World
From the above working concepts of a smart city in the 
developed world, it can be deduce that the foremost 
tasks of the cities are the improvement of service 
efficiency, governance, and the environmental 
sustainability. The problem of natural resources 
and energy costs must be addressed adequately 
and the carbon emission levels must be lowered 
to prevent global warming. Today’s information and 
communication technology can assist in finding 
solutions to such problems. For example, smart grid 
integrates information communication technology 
with the city’s energy supply system for increased 
effi ciency and reduced energy wastes. It allows for 
a decentralized power supply system and increased 
consumption of renewable energy. Such integration 
of the existing infrastructures with information 
communication technologies and environmental-
friendly technologies can reduce the consumption 
of natural resources and greenhouse gases to 
prevent global warming. Information communication 
technology can also be integrated with transport 
and sewerage systems for increased effi ciency. The 
concepts of smart city from the developed world 
tend to focus on effi ciency of existing systems and 
sustainability of natural environments.
The focus of developing countries shows subtle 
differences from developed countries. The smart 
cities of the developing world have yet another 
task that must be taken care of: the rapid growth of 
population and urbanization. If the city is not ready 
for a rapid growth in its urban population, its citizens 
will be riddled with poverty that deteriorates the 
quality of their lives and will suffer from excessive 
environmental degradation that ultimately endangers 
the city’s sustainability.
Cities also play a key role in national economic 
development. With properly planned cities, 
developing countries can actualize its economic 
potential, consume energy more efficiently and 
reduce inequalities to provide a sustainable 
livelihood for its citizens. Urbanization is not just a 
result of growth but can be a driver of that progress 
and that is why urban development is in need to 
eradicate poverty. However, growing cities come 
to face many problems; increased slum population, 
spread and proliferation of informal sectors, lacking 
infrastructure, expanding sprawls, damaging the 
natural environment, social and political confl icts 
and natural disasters. For a city to play its role in 
bringing about economic and social development, 
the aforementioned problems must be addressed 
with effective urban planning and governance. For 
such successful urbanization, India and China defi ne 
smart city as follows.
 India: A smart city should provide the city’s public 
services (sewage, sanitation, health, etc.), 
attract investments, have fair administration, 
and make citizens feel happy and safe. (Indian 
Department of Urban Development. 2014)
 China: Smart city projects have been 
declared to combat the following: rapidly 
growing cities, pollution, disrupted public 
order, slow administrative systems, and 
increasingly dissatisfied citizens. They 
should also; promote a domestic business 
boom, intelligently manage the city with 
information communication technology, and 
manage basic infrastructure facilities. This 
would include a network for various services 
provided for the citizens such as; traffic, 
energy, waste disposal, environmental watch 
and healthcare. (China 2012)
As seen above, while developed countries are more 
concerned with the environment and its resources, 









on founding infrastructure, business revitalization 
that encompasses both investment and business, 
the fair and effi cient administration, safety and public 
order. All of which are problems that rapidly growing 
cities come to face.
Information communication technology is vital in 
providing a ‘smart’ solution to the aforementioned 
tasks, but the use of such technology is not what 
defi nes a ‘smart city’.  A more important defi nition 
is how it provides solutions to become a highly 
effi cient, immaculate, attractive and an economically 
vital future-oriented city. Achieving such tasks 
successfully can make a city ‘smart’.
Half a century ago Seoul has been a city that 
was stricken with poverty, poor economy, sprawl, 
slums, congestion, unsanitary conditions, sewerage 
problems and lacking drinking water. These 
conditions became worse due to an explosive urban 
population growth. Today, Seoul is a clean and 
economically active city with effi cient public services 
that include: sewerage, water, traffic, internet, 
and e-government. Seoul has been successfully 
transformed into one of best livable and sustainable 
cities in the world by solving these urban problems 
which a rapidly growing city faces and developing 
the city’s economy.2
Furthermore, Seoul’s energy consumption and 
greenhouse gas emission per capita is lower than 
other cities of similar population and economic 
scale. The city has high energy effi ciency, protects 
its natural areas, uses less land for building cities 
and minimizes the effects urban expansion has on 
the environment. In comparison, Seoul is a city that 
produces more with fewer resources. 
Information technology has also assisted in 
digitalizing the government to assist in establishing 
a governance system. Seoul’s digital governance 
began in the year 2000 by disclosing the administrative 
information and processes to the public through the 
Internet to prevent corruption and to gain the trust 
of the citizens. E-governance made administration 
more effi cient, more customer-oriented and more 
transparent. Seoul’s e-governance has continued 
to develop itself and now has become the bi-lateral 
governance system that works for its citizens.
How was this outcome achieved? Seoul is a ‘smart 
city’ in two ways– infrastructure technology in the 
early stages, 1960s to 1990s, of urban development 
and information technology since 2000. Two specifi c 
examples, innovative transportation and governance 
with information technology, will be discussed in the 
following.3
Figure 1:
Successful Transformation of Seoul from 1960’s to 2000’s
                                       (a) 1960’s                                                                              (b) 2000’s
2 For more on development of Seoul, refer to the last issue’s (World & Cities Iss.8, 2015 Winter) ‘Why Seoul?’
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Figure 2:
Population Density and Carbon Emissions per Capita by Metropolitan Area
Public Transportation Reform with 
Information Technology and New 
Regulations
Until 2002, Seoul’s general traffi c condition, despite 
continuous construction of roads and subways, had 
continued to worsen due to increasing population 
and number of vehicles (especially, single occupancy 
vehicles), parking problems, and unregulated bus 
service. Before the reform, private cars were pointed 
out as a major cause of traffi c congestion since 
they occupied 72% of the road and 79% of them 
had a single driver. The social cost for severe traffi c 
congestion was huge, reaching 5 trillion won per year 
and energy consumption for car operation reaching 
4.1 trillion won.
Public transportation in Seoul had many problems 
such as poor operating systems and limited fi nancial 
status. Due to the poor bus service, people stretched 
their budget to buy their own cars. In turn, automobile 
ownership continuously increased, which caused 
serious traffi c congestion. Road congestion further 
lowered the bus service quality since buses could 
not arrive on time due to reduced speeds. Citizens 
gradually became reluctant to use buses. The bus 
share of transport numbers tended to decrease 
year by year, dropping from 37% in 1995 to 27% 
in 2002. This contributed to a vicious circle, of bus 
companies’ fi nancial diffi culties leading to repetitive 
fare increases and poorer service.
The fact that bus services were private businesses 
with little public regulation caused a vicious circle. 
Individual bus companies tried to maximize their 
profi ts, so they tended to run only profi table routes. 
Bus services were over duplicated along more 
profi table routes and disregarded in non-profi table 










Degradation of Transportation and its Social Cost
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government (circa 2009)
bus service coverage was limited. Moreover, there 
was little integration among transportation modes 
of buses, subways, bikes and walkways, thus 
discouraging citizens’ use of public transportation. 
Seoul public transportation needed a readjustment 
and an integration of public transportation services 
with new regulations and technology.
Bus Reform from Private to 
Quasi-public System
Previously, each bus route was exclusively operated 
by private bus companies on the basis of a licensing 
system. Privatization of bus routes made it diffi cult to 
adjust bus lines, which resulted in an imbalance of 
service stability between profi table and unprofi table 
routes. In addition, excessive competition in the 
overlapping profitable lines led to irregular bus 
operations to secure more passengers, resulting 
in poor service levels. Since bus companies 
exclusively operated the secured route, competition 
among them for management rationalization was 
absent, which resulted in lax management and 
low operation effi ciency. Due to the bus industry’s 
fi nancial diffi culties, the fi nancial burden of the Seoul 
municipality also increased gradually
The core concept of the quasi-public bus system 
was to transform bus routes and operational 
systems to serve public interests. The Seoul city 
government took the right to adjust bus lines away 
from private companies, pursued public welfare of 
bus services as well as improved service levels. 
By jointly managing revenue and redistributing it 
based on operational performance, bus operation 
and revenue management was separated. The 
revenue pool management system collected all the 
fares of bus operation, regardless of profi table or 
unprofi table routes, and redistributed them. In the 
process, bus companies whose expenses exceeded 
their income were reimbursed for their shortfalls, 
others returned their surplus. In other words, surplus 
in profi table routes was used to compensate defi cits 
in unprofi table lines. 
The quasi-public bus system was composed of 
three major components: public management, 
private operation and operational infrastructure. 
First, public management meant that the Seoul 
municipality would decide and adjust bus routes to 
properly accommodate people’s traffi c demands. 
Evaluation systems were also established to 
examine operational performance, service levels, 
and contract fulfi llment. Second, private operation 
meant that the consortium of existing and new bus 
companies took control of the actual operations by 
settling expenses and managing vehicles, facilities 
and employees. The last component of operational 
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bus-related infrastructure such as public garage, 
median bus lane system, central control center, 
bus signal priority system, and the fi nancial system 
through which income was redistributed and bus 
companies were guaranteed a reasonable profi t. For 
that purpose, the Seoul city government established 
the fare settlement center and other organizations.
Joint revenue management was an essential 
prerequisite for the public transportation system. For 
this, standard bus operation costs had to be settled, 
based on which revenue could be redistributed. In 
the beginning, the Seoul city government and the 
Seoul Bus Association estimated bus operation 
cost separately and tried to reach agreement 
through negotiation, which turned out to be diffi cult. 
Eventually, the subcommittee of the Bus Reform 
Citizens Committee determined the standard 
operation cost. 
The revenue pool management enabled bus 
companies to provided stable bus operation 
regardless of passenger demands. In addition, bus 
companies no longer had to stick to the profi table 
routes. For the revenue pool management, subsidies 
had to be paid, but it was impossible without a 
revision of ‘Passenger Transport Service Act,’ the 
legal basis of bus operation, because it limited 
financial support to ‘operations in unprofitable 
routes.’ The revision required agreements from the 
central government. But their early position was 
that it was diffi cult to allow exceptions for Seoul’s 
special situation, even though they understood the 
purpose of the reform. In response, the city offi cials 
in Seoul persuaded the central government through 
persistent meetings and visits, and eventually 
revised the law and ordinances to prepare for the 
legal foundation of the quasi-public system.
Improvement of Bus Routes
The previous bus routes were often too long or 
circuitous, which brought about excessive traveling 
time and traffi c congestion, thus decreasing the 
overall service quality of Seoul’s public transport. 
In addition, heavy overlapping of bus routes in 
limited areas decreased operation efficiency, 
while other areas were abandoned. Discrepancies 
between passenger’s service demand and the bus 
operation resulted in the poor service level. Bus 
speeds were low and time of arrival was irregular 
and untrustworthy. In addition, intense competition 
with the subway system and lack of connections 
to the subway negated a comprehensive public 
transportation service. 
The Seoul city government divided bus routes 
into trunk lines for inter-regional, middle to long 
distances, and feeder lines for short rides within each 
region. The priorities in designing inter-regional and 
trunk lines were to improve operation effi ciency by 
straightening and shortening lines, while avoiding 
overlap. The feeder and circular lines focused on 
improving accessibility by satisfying traffi c demands 
within the region and making it easy to transfer to 
the trunk lines
Depending on the function, buses were divided 
into interregional (red), trunk (blue), feeder (green) 
and circular (yellow) lines, and the systematization 
of each line enhanced mobility, accessibility and 
convenience of bus services. The Seoul municipality 
also devised measures to enhance operation 
effi ciency. Transfer terminals were installed in major 
points like Cheongnyangni to make it easy to transfer 
from bus to bus and from bus to subway. 
Information Technology for Public 
Transportation Improvement
For the new public transportation system, an 
information system base was necessary. To integrate 
and process the information collected from related 
organizations, TOPIS (Seoul Transport Operation 
and Information Service) as well as BMS (Bus 
Management System) and BIS (Bus Information 
System) were established.
Before the reform, the bus fare system charged a 
fl at rate regardless of travelling distance, and each 
route had an independent fare system. Through the 
reform, the fare system changed to distance-based 
with free transfers. The subway system also adopted 
a distance scale rate system in the metropolitan 
area, and it was integrated with the bus fare system. 
For a single bus trip, a fl at rate is charged as before. 
When transferring from bus to bus, the transfer is 
free, transfers from bus to subway or vice versa a 
discounted fare is collected. Through these changes, 
the citizens’ public transportation fee decreased by 











IT System for Public Transportation
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government (circa 2009)
Figure 5:
Cost Reduction after Reform with Distance-based Fare System
Betterment in Livability and 
Sustainability
The bus reform has increased the speed of buses 
during peak times by 30% on average, 10 to 80%, 
depending on the section. In addition, punctuality 
of bus services improved thanks to the information 
technology that includes scientifi c bus management 
with BMS, and quasi-public collaborative operation 
among buses.
The bus reform has increased the speed of bus in the 
peak time by 30% on average (10 ~ 80% depending 
on the section). In addition, punctuality of bus service 
improved thanks to the information technology 
including scientifi c bus management with BMS, and 
quasi-public collaborative operation among buses.
After the reform, citizen’s satisfaction for public 
transport significantly improved. According to 
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Institute in June 2005, the satisfaction rate increased 
from 14.2% to 36.9% after the reform. Major factors 
for the satisfaction were ‘discounted transfer fare’ 
and ‘connection between subway and bus.
The integration between buses and subway systems 
brought about increases in ridership of both. Public 
transit ridership showed a decline by 2.1% in the 
fi rst half of 2004, but it was converted to an increase 
by 5.5% during the period of July 2004 to June 
2005. Bus ridership increased by 6% and town 
bus passengers particularly increased by 26.4%. 
Such an explosion of town bus ridership occurred 
because the integrated fare system (free transfer 
fare) motivated people to use town buses, rather 
than walking, when they accessed nearby subway 
stations or bus stops. Increased ridership resulted 
in the increase in revenue by 10.3%. The transfer 
rate of public transport increased in response to 
the reform, and transfer rate of the buses soared 
in particular. Since the burden of transfer between 
different transport modes was relieved by the 
integrated fare system, people now seem to have 
more freedom to choose more reasonable modes 
of transportation. 
Transportation reform contributed Seoul’s PM10 
decrease from over 75㎍/m3 in 2002 to 44㎍/m3 
in 2013, which became lower than the Korean air 
quality standard (50㎍/m3). NO2 has also been 
decreasing from 0.037ppm in 2001 to 0.033ppm in 
2013, yet it needs more improvement to meet the 
Korean air quality standard of NO2 of 0.02ppm.
OPEN: e-Government for 
Transparency and Effi ciency
In July 1998, Mayor Kun Goh began his term in the 
mayoral offi ce. The city of Seoul then launched an 
anti-corruption campaign to ensure a transparent 
administration. Despite such an endeavor, on 
19th January 1999, the newly-appointed chief of 
the Administrative Bureau, a position that was 
supposed to play the key role in the anti-corruption 
campaign, was arrested for taking bribes. Mayor 
Goh was tremendously shocked by this scandal 
and wanted stronger measures to be taken. On 
25th January 1999, Mayor Goh proposed, as the 
second step of anti-corruption campaign, that the city 
government develop an e-Government system that 
can ensure transparency. Seoul started to develop 
an open online civil petition system, which began the 
e-governance system of Seoul.
OPEN (Online Procedures 
ENhancement for civil applications)
Just like the sunlight kills the germs, the OPEN aimed 
to prevent corruption through the transparency, 
which enabled citizens to monitor the procedures 
of civil applications and petitions over the Internet. 
Seoul made the procedure visible from petition 
reception to fi nal decision, so that the fi lers could 
follow the procedure on a real-time basis on line. 
For example, a citizen who submitted a request 
Figure 6:









for construction permission could easily check the 
current status of her/his request online, even from 
home without meeting or calling the city hall.
By disclosing the procedures on a real-time 
basis, Seoul sought to prevent irregularities in the 
administration. Seoul also intended to enhance 
the credibility of the administration. This bi-lateral 
governance system helped restore the credibility of 
the administration. Seoul aimed to create a system 
that can satisfy both citizens and the city government 
by ensuring citizens’ participation. By making the 
administrative service easier and more affordable 
for the citizens, the city laid the groundwork for 
better communication between the citizens and 
the city government to create a highly participatory 
governance. (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 
2001b, p.50)
Seoul built OPEN within less than three months and 
launched on 15th April 1999. OPEN started with 
disclosing the procedure of corruption-vulnerable 
petitions: petitions that are complex, exposed to 
interest of various stakeholders, and prone to 
bribe. Twenty six civil application procedures were 
disclosed at fi rst. Later, Fifty-four civil application 
procedures in 10 sectors were disclosed. As of 2005, 
a total of 111 procedures in 11 sector (including 
71 procedures in 10 sector and 40 procedures of 
petition-related committees) were being disclosed 
through the OPEN system (Choi 2006)
The Information Disclosure Act of that time stipulated 
that the government didn’t need to disclose the 
information unless disclosure request is submitted 
by the people. However, the OPEN system of Seoul 
enabled a step-by-step disclosure of administrative 
process even without any request from the people, 
innovatively enhancing the transparency. 
The OPEN system also displayed a fl ow chart to let 
citizens, who are not familiar with the administrative 
process, anticipate the process going forward. 
Disclosing the whole process of dealing with petitions 
played the important role in deterring irregularities 
and corruptions, because it enabled everyone to 
know who made what decision at which point. It also 
enhanced effi ciency of internal audit and monitoring 
to uncover and control irregularities and corruptions. 
The OPEN system was synched to the electronic 
document approval system later.
Information Technology for OPEN
In order to ensure an efficient automation of 
administration, the Seoul Metropolitan Government 
came up with a broadband network establishment 
plan and installed ATM exchangers at the main 
and annex buildings of city hall, the Information 
Management Office, and the 25 district offices, 
which were connected to the central Information 
Management Offi ce on E1-grade speed (2Mbps). 
The network started operation in 1997. In January 
2001, the city devised a framework plan to build 
a “data highway” that would allow STM-4 grade 
speed (622Mbps) instead of the previous level at E1 
(2Mbps), by routing fi ber-optic cables in the common 
ducts of the subway routes in Seoul.
The Data Highway project was a three-year 
project (2000-2002) aimed at establishing a data 
infrastructure that would connect 30 agencies under 
the city government. Fiber-optic cables dedicated 
for this project were to be routed in the common 
ducts, taking advantage of both the old and new 
subway routes. Also, underground duct lines were 
to be created to connect the government offi ces and 
the mechanical room of the nearest subway station 
via fi ber-optic cables. Six selected key points were 
connected to one another with a speed of 2.5Gbps, 
while the remaining 24 offi ces were connected via 
622-Mbps branch networks. 
Each node was tied in the form of a ring, in order 
to duplicate the circuit for backup, ensure the 
credibility, and enable a one-stop management of the 
network. At the same time, factors such as network 
extensibility, economic feasibility and adaptability 
of future technologies, compatibility with other 
standard networks were taken into consideration for 
an effi cient system management. 
Better Governance
The OPEN system made practical contributions 
to eradicate corruption of the public offi cials in the 
course of dealing with petitions. People no longer 
needed to mobilize an acquaintance in the city hall 
or asked to pay an “express charge.” The process 
of dealing with petitions was accelerated, with no 
more delays due to unclear reasons. Overall, the 
system effectively enhanced effi ciency and quality 
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Eradication of corruptions and reduction of 
administrative irregularities were the most important 
purpose of introducing the OPEN system. In 
conclusion, the system effectively works. Since 
1999 when the OPEN system was introduced, the 
number of public offi cials involved in corruption or 
irregularities dropped by a signifi cant margin. The 
audit team of the Seoul Metropolitan Government 
uncovered an average of 79.1 corrupted offi cials 
after the introduction of the OPEN system, down 
30.9% from the previous average of 114.5 offi cials. 
The number of bribery cases detected halved while 
dereliction of duties decreased by 72.2%. In terms of 
sector, corruptions committed by offi cials in charge 
of housing and construction projects accounted 
for 17.8% of the total after the OPEN system 
introduction, a sharp drop from 42.9% prior to the 
system introduction.4
68.7% of citizen respondents said that corruption 
had decreased since the introduction of the OPEN 
system. 45.1% of public offi cials responded in the 
same way: a little bit lower than the rate of positive 
response among the citizen respondents. Overall, 
the system was received widely in a positive way 
that it helped decrease corruption.
To the question, what benefi t will the OPEN system 
have in the petition process and administrative 
organization, the following results were given: 22% 
of public offi cials pointed out confi dence-building 
between the government and the citizens, while 
17.5% pointed a reduction of irregularities by 
enhanced transparency. For the same question, 
citizen respondents selected enhanced effi ciency 
(36.5%) and reduction of irregularities (25.3%). 
Figure 7:
Map of the Ring-shaped Data Highway 
4 This result could be a combined effect of various anti-corruption measures. It is almost impossible to separate the 









Before the introduction of the OPEN system, it took 
an average of 7.7 days to complete the treatment of 
a 10-day due petition. The duration decreased to 7 
days after the introduction of the system, speeding 
up the time on an average of 10%.
59% or more than half of public offi cials responded 
that they have the opportunity of understanding the 
works of their colleagues, subordinates or bosses 
via the OPEN system. Also, 75% of them said that 
the OPEN system helped them better understand 
the work of their colleagues.  In conclusion, most 
of citizens viewed that the OPEN system helped 
enhance the administrative effi ciency while the public 
offi cials mostly appreciated the effect of confi dence 
and transparency building.
CONCLUSION
There are advantages and challenges of urban 
agglomeration. As many people live and work in a 
small area, the city and its citizens can enjoy the 
benefi t from division of labor, economies of scale, 
agglomeration economies, diversity, and value 
added from trade. However, as many people live and 
work in a small area, the city and its citizens may 
suffer from congestion, pollution, and shortages of 
public services. Smart city is a city that maximizes 
the utility of agglomeration and minimizes the 
disutility of congestion with advanced technology 
and new rules. 
Although cities in the developed world focus 
on information technology for efficiency and 
sustainability, those cities in the developing countries 
have to adopt both infrastructure technology (IT1) 
and information technology (IT2) for livability, 
prosperity, and sustainability.
Smart City is a city that successfully solves the tasks 
it faces and develops itself as a future-oriented city 
using the best available technology. Today, the cities 
of the world are looking to increase the effi ciency 
of their public services and create a bi-lateral 
governance system that works for its citizens and an 
eco-friendly city that adapts to the change in climate. 
Furthermore, in the developing countries, it is a city 
that adequately makes use of the available lands, 
protects the natural areas, promotes economic 
growth and fi ghts poverty. A ‘smart city’ ultimately 
is a city that resolves all of the above given tasks 
effectively and effi ciently using advanced technology 
and knowledge.
Seoul has successfully increased the effectiveness 
and effi ciency of its infrastructure and public services 
in all fi elds and also created a governance system that 
works for its citizens. Buses in Seoul were operated by 
many individual private companies. Government had 
little control of routes and schedules, but it set fares 
and provided subsidies. Bus routes were winding 
and not integrated with the subway. Bus companies 
were only interested in profi t maximization, with 
little attention to safety and comfort of citizens. 
Quality of bus service was not safe, uncomfortable, 
and unreliable. As a consequence, transit ridership 
decreased and pollution increased. With information 
technology Seoul’s public transportation system 
was innovatively reformed. It coordinated buses’ 
routes and schedules, and integrated buses with the 
subway. Information technology and new regulations 
drove the successful reforms.
As shown in the results of surveys and audits 
conducted by the city, the OPEN system contributed 
greatly to enhancing the transparency of Seoul 
administration, thereby reducing corruption and 
building confi dence of the citizens. Even though 
it would be difficult to strictly verify the real 
effectiveness of the system in corruption eradication, 
the system did successfully ensure transparency 
and deter corruptions caused in the past by the 
information asymmetry between the public offi cials 
and the citizens.
It was remarkable that such a new system as the 
OPEN was launched within two and a half months. 
The mayor’s strong leadership played the crucial 
part in realizing the idea into specifi c programs, 
at the same time, overcoming diffi culties such as 
resistance from the public offi cials. When it wasn’t 
even legally stipulated that active disclosure of 
data was necessary, the mayoral leadership was 
indispensable to such the innovative approach of 
disclosing each step of the petition procedure on 
the Internet.
The city of Seoul continued moving toward 
e-Government even after the launch of the OPEN 
system. Since 2000, the Seoul Metropolitan 
Government reinforced its electronic drive to 
integrate information services and encourage 
citizens’ participation. The SMG worked on the 
capitalize as “Policy to Link and Integrate Information 
Services and Resources” in 2003-2004, the 
“Sophistication of Integrated Data Resources and 
Encouragement of Citizens’ e-Government Service 
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in 2006-2010. Since 2011, it launched the “Smart 
Seoul” campaign and continued to work to create 
a smart-technology-based city government that 
utilize the development of ICT technologies. It is 
becoming a leading e-Government city by forging 
ties with global cities and advancing the city’s 
brand as a cutting-edge ICT city. Thanks to such an 
effort, the city of Seoul ranked fi rst in the World City 
e-Government Survey for four consecutive years 
since 2003, hosted the inaugural general meeting 
of the WeGO (World e-Government Organization), 
and won the second prize in the UN Public Services 
Awards with its “Oasis of 10 Million’s Imaginations” 
project.
Should a new technology develop in the future 
that can further improve the lives and work of its 
citizens, the city will be called a ‘smart city.’ Smart 
city is a future-oriented city that makes use of the 
latest technology and knowledge in successfully 
solving its tasks to develop and transform itself in 
order to maintain a high quality of life, prosperity, 
sustainability, and equality.
Figure 8:
Smart City and Technology
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